CHAPTER EIGHT: German-US relations in the NATO context Narrator: Germany has long played a key role in both NATO and transatlantic relations in general. During the Cold War, Germany's division epitomized the struggle between East and West. What roles can Germany play today in promoting security in Europe?
Dr. Kenneth Moss: Well, I think the Germans have a real opportunity here to be both a, I would say a good supplement as well as a complement to U.S. objectives with the Russians. After all, to some extent, if the Obama Administration, let's say, succeeds in its approach to the Russians on the Ballistic Missile Defense issue, that's going to alleviate a concern that has played a role in German domestic politics ever since the Bush Administration posed the prospect of the deployment of those systems in the Czech Republic and Poland. The Germans have tended to see that as an antagonizing, provocative development in some ways opposite the Russians. They would prefer to see it negotiated rather than to see it evolve in a way that would make the Russians more confrontational towards Europe as well as the United States. And complicate the sensitive framework that exists because of German energy dependence on Russia. And that is certainly a lever the Russians can use. They know it. But it's to Germany's advantage, I think, to support the Obama Administration where it can, in encouraging the Russians to take those measures for example in relation to Iran. Also, and here I don't think the Germans would have that much of a problem either, as the Obama Administration begins to explore avenues for disarmament, whether it is building on the Moscow treaty of several years ago or, you might say, reinvigorating the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and pushing that process forward, something which Germany is very strongly committed to and has played a very important role in. These are developments and trends where the thrust, the direction of Obama's policies I think parallel or converge potentially very well with German interests and in that sense Germany's own understanding, it's own relationship with the Russians, I think it can play an effective role as a facilitator, as a catalyst perhaps, as a setting or venue for some of these types of discussions. That will depend again on I suppose the capabilities of the German government. It is at times constricted by the current grand coalition structure. Of course, you have elections next year in Germany. But in reality the boundaries of German foreign policy aren't that radically different whether it's a Social Democrat who sits in the Chancellor's chair or whether it's a member of the CDU. There are differences, but not radical differences.
CHAPTER NINE: The significance of Obama's Muslim heritage for foreign policy and minority relations Narrator: In his first major interview after becoming President, Barack Obama sat down with Dubai-based station Al Arabiya. The discussion focused on how the United States and the new administration would emphasize mutual respect, listening, and a new discussion on militarism. How does Obama intend to relate to the Muslim world?
Dr. Kenneth Moss: Well, I think Obama – simply consider his own background. This is a President who has a radically different background from any occupant in the White House. And I'm speaking not only in terms of race, but also part of his heritage is Muslim. He is aware of that, it makes him aware of the changes in the world; it makes him certainly sensitive to the role, the importance of the Muslim community in the international system. I think he's trying to find a different vocabulary to approach it. A vocabulary that stresses more cultural understanding, recognition of the values, but also trying to reflect on the similarities that often exist between the broader Christian world and the broader Muslim world. A vocabulary of tolerance and imagery that is quite powerful, I think. I have not traveled recently in the Muslim world, but through correspondence with some professional contacts I have in it, the impact of this President's election certainly caught its attention. Has it convinced it or persuaded it to drop its doubts or suspicions about the United States – no, not necessarily. But the fact that the United States has elected a President with the middle name of Hussein is not something that you could, not a prospect you could easily consider right now in Germany, or France, or Spain, or Italy. And the fact that Arab-Americans have a per-capita income that is slightly over the national average is also something that is not reflected in most West European settings. There are attributes of American society that in a sense make it more open. At the same time, it is ironic perhaps, I say ironic because in one sense, many Europeans are always astonished about the, and troubled by the religious overtone of some of our political discourse and how at times obsessed Americans seem to be with religion, and yet it is this country which because of its particular approach to separation of state and religion, finds a much easier way of accommodating a non-Christian religious tradition than much as western Europe does, which wrestles with this question of Christian identity.
CHAPTER TEN: The role of Scandinavia in current and emerging security challenges Narrator: The countries collectively known as Scandinavia – Norway, Sweden, and Denmark – are long-time allies of the United States. Many Americans may not realize the important role these countries have played in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. And in the future, as Dr. Moss explains, Scandinavian expertise may become a key part of managing emerging security challenges.
Dr. Kenneth Moss: First of all, I think one of the factors that Americans should keep in mind when you're talking about Scandinavia collectively is the instrumental role that the countries have played in support of international organizations, international bodies, peacekeeping, peace monitoring efforts. The high levels in terms of percentage of GDP that they contribute to foreign assistance. As we talk ourselves about trying to put more balance into our foreign policy or as we call it down at National Defense University, our national security strategy, less emphasis on the military arm and building some muscle on the other arm. The Scandinavians - consider the size of their resources, both human and economic – have done a significant amount in that area. And they deserve the recognition for it. I think that that type of approach is something we ourselves can learn from. I'll illustrate with an example. It's from Afghanistan, in fact. A couple years ago, a Danish scholar provided to me a report that was based on Denmark's own experiences in northern Afghanistan. What was interesting about it was it already was fleshing out some of the arguments which we only turned to later on in a sense of finding different ways of interacting with the local populace. And the importance of course on reconstruction and stabilization as well as active military missions. And the Danes have in their own way been quite active in Afghanistan. The previous President, President Bush recognized that. The Norwegians, of course, have also been active. They, too have a presence in Afghanistan. Sweden has had this unique neutral status, although it's sort of a pro-Western neutrality. It's an EU member now, though. But when you look at that role in multinational peacekeeping, international organizations – options which this new administration is talking about much more, and even I think the issue I talked about in terms of humanitarian intervention – these are questions that the Scandinavians think about a great deal and have something to say on. Another issue that is growing importantly is the whole issue surrounding the status of the Arctic. The impact of global warming, exploration of natural resources in that area, but also how do you handle movement of sea traffic through it; do you do this through international bodies such as the Arctic Council, or do you argue that this is an area where NATO should expand its presence, but along with that people should be asking if you go the NATO route, does that also cause the Russians, in a sense, increasingly view that region as a place of confrontation as well. That's a significant strategic question that we will have to think about more in the coming decades and beyond. Again, the Scandinavians have an important voice in that. Simply because they're there, in part, but also they have the institutional memory and experience.
