CHAPTER FOUR: NATO's future – the role of EU capability Narrator: France recently announced that they will rejoin NATO's integrated command structure more than 40 years after Charles DeGaulle pulled France out in 1966. Despite criticism, French President Nicolas Sarkozy stated it made no sense for a founding member of NATO such as France to have no say in NATO's decisions on military strategy. With the Cold War now over and new challenges looming, we asked Dr. Moss about the issue of European capability as NATO looks ahead.
Dr. Kenneth Moss: I think NATO has a future to play, getting there is going to be very hard. Getting there within a few years I think would be impossible because of the inherent nature of most institutions, they change slowly and also, you're talking about change at a time when you have major economic dislocation. Change is very hard and there's another side of this which I think the United States probably needs to address and perhaps this administration will do so more directly. At times we have presented our European allies in NATO with a somewhat schizophrenic message. We want them to do more, we have promoted that particularly through the NATO context, we have certainly given official support on paper and you might say verbally to EU efforts to strengthen their capabilities in security and defense areas but sometimes I would say the follow through on that has much more mixed. We have been uncomfortable with the premise that a capable European Union in defense matters might detract or pull away resources that could be committed to NATO or that the European side of NATO would use the EU to, you might say, “pre-cook” positions that would be developed without any U.S. input. I think we are coming to the point where, and I suspect this administration at least by some of its statements, seems to be prepared to more aggressively encourage EU capabilities in defense and security. And to push those with the recognition that, yes, there may be some tension, but if you're going to really encourage European attention and European strategic thinking, you need to do that through an EU framework perhaps even more than do through a NATO framework. CHAPTER FIVE: Realities of US and EU decisionmaking on security matters Narrator: The transatlantic relationship is one the most significant in the world certainly in economic terms. The relationship also brings together a group of countries that share certain values rooted in democracy and free societies. Despite agreement on these points, NATO allies often disagree. Dr. Moss addresses the complaint sometimes heard in America that the pace of decision-making in Europe is too slow.
Dr. Kenneth Moss: It is frustrated by that fact, and at times understandably so. But given Europe's history in the first half of the twentieth century, there's an understandable emphasis on the importance of consensus and transparency. Now sometimes the European Union doesn't follow through as well on transparency. But, anyhow, certainly the members of the EU, particularly the leading members, many of them place a very high emphasis on law, openness of decisions and it was that emphasis that in some ways contributed to the division between us and Europe in 2002-2003 as we prepared for the Iraq war. The need for consensus is slow, but I think the United States needs to appreciate that. We have certainly learned perhaps with difficulty some of the lessons that are paid when you enter into an operation such as the scale of Iraq without the support of key allies and that support counts in many ways besides just operational capability for the military. Therefore, it requires a little more time. I think this new administration is willing to work that process more and recognize that you cannot necessarily obtain fast or quick agreement but part of this is also simply coming down to that fact that what one would call strategic thought in Europe on the EU level is a fairly new development. So, were the EU to address a set of issues and try to develop a strategy, a European strategy is, yes, they have done that but it requires time, it is not an easy process. One can make the same conclusion just looking at the U.S. process. We have difficulty at times creating consensus within our own system. I f you imagine what it would be like with over 20 states trying to craft an agreement amongst themselves. So there is a lot of history - cultural, linguistic – that simply cannot be overcome that quickly. In 60 years, when you look in the sense of what has transpired in Europe, actually it's remarkable that they have come to the point where they have. CHAPTER SIX: The Obama Administration's approach to US-Russia relations Narrator: The future of NATO, of course, cannot be completely addressed without considering relations with Russia. As the Obama Administration's foreign policy team meets and begins working with it's counterparts in Europe and beyond, many observers are asking if a new approach is being offered. Dr. Kenneth Moss: I think, yes, the administration is clearly trying to find new avenues to discuss issues with the Russians. And I think they're trying to develop these frameworks in ways that are not as dependent on personality as they were perhaps during the first part of the Bush Two administration where the President, at least publicly, put a great deal of emphasis on his relationship with Putin, his ability to read his soul, his personality. And that's not to say that when you look back in the first part of the second Bush Administration that there weren't some significant steps. Yes, on the one side, the united States pulled out of the ABM Treaty, but we also continued negotiations with the Russians that led at least to the implementation of the Treaty of Moscow in 2003 which continued the arms reduction framework that had been put into place going back really to the Reagan Administration. But that, by and large, broke up as the following years ensued. Not completely for reasons that can be blamed on the United States. We have to try to determine what Russian motives are as well. There's a great deal of disagreement on that - as to what their objectives are; why the nationalist turn in their foreign and defense policy; why the concentration of power particularly in the figure of the President; why the elimination of dissent. These are all factors that have to be brought into mind. I think what this administration is trying to do is approach the Russians with an effort to try to look at the question “what are our priorities with Russia”.
CHAPTER SEVEN: US-Russia relations, continued – Ballistic Missile Defense and Iran Narrator: Russia remains today an important participant in the major diplomatic challenges facing the international community. At the top of the agenda are two related issues: Ballistic Missile Defense and Iran's nuclear program. Dr. Kenneth Moss helps us understand the strategic background and recent events such as a letter sent to Russian President Medvedev from President Obama.
Dr. Kenneth Moss: For example, if you take ballistic missile defense, which the Russians have fixated on. Statistically, ten BMD systems in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic are hardly enough to undermine Russia's strategic capabilities. But one does have to keep in mind history. Russia's historic interest in protecting its flanks, you might say, from the West; it's desire for stability on its borders; and I suppose in a sense the sensitivity, at least with the way Putin has tried to play it, that it seemed as if the Americans in particular were trying to rub Russia's face in the dirt a little bit after the early 1990's and remind them that, well, you're no longer the big players that you think you are. And I'm not certain in hindsight that some of the statements we made, some of the steps we took were all that well measured. So the administration I think is trying to find ways of reaching an accommodation with the Russians and to do it through broader frameworks. This letter, I have not read it, so I can only go by press accounts, poses the issue of the status of those BMD systems in the context of Russia's own concerns with Iran. We know the Russians don't want the Iranians to have nuclear capabilities in the form of missiles and nuclear warheads. They're quite happy to supply the Iranians with the technology to support their energy program, and have been doing so, but given Russia's own problems in the south – a growing Islamic population, interplay that some Iranian Shia leaders have with some sect leaders in the southern part of Russia and the Newly Independent States, now not so newly independent – these are factors that we are trying to appeal to the Russians. We have always made the point it's the Iranian development of missile capability and the potential of hitting western Europe that was the reason for those BMD capabilities in central Europe anyway. In a sense what we're telling them – if you can work with us in a way of finding and dissuading the Iranians from taking this course, the systems probably can be removed. It poses a question of the Russians, can they deliver. I guess that's a question which probably we don't have complete agreement on as to whether or not they really have that much leverage with Tehran, they certainly have some, we know that. Are they willing to deliver, which is another question. And, if not, what really are your objectives about the systems in central Europe. So in a sense it does force them to put their cards on the table. You know, we also know the Russians have an interest in the stabilization of the Middle East; they're part of the process. They certainly have interests in the outcome of Iraq and Afghanistan.
